gen. eric k. shinseki
General Eric Ken Shinseki (born November 28, 1942) was the 34th Chief of Staff of the United States Army (1999 - 2003). [1]
In this interview he discusses the bitter prewar struggle between the Pentagon and the Army over troop levels for the war, and the Bush administation’s failure to heed warnings from a range of experts in the U.S. government about postwar problems. [2]
Like Rumsfeld, Shinseki wanted to “transform” the armed services and had announced his plan for changing the Army when he became chief of staff in 1999. [...] When Donald H. Rumsfeld swooped down on the Pentagon in 2001 as President Bush’s secretary of Defense, Gen. Eric Shinseki must have looked like a natural ally to him. [3]
Appointed Army chief of staff in June 1999, he is calling for an Army transformation that will better prepare it to fight the new 21st century wars. [4]
In a contentious exchange over the costs of war with Iraq, the Pentagon’s second-ranking official today disparaged a top Army general’s assessment of the number of troops needed to secure postwar Iraq. [5]
In response to questioning by Sen. Carl Levin of Michigan, the senior Democrat on the committee, Shinseki said he couldn’t give specific numbers of the size of an occupation force but would rely on the recommendations of commanders in the region. [6]
Early this month at Pomona College, he outlined his policy for a post-Cold War Army equipped to deal with a multitude of duties. [3]
Through a process of negotiation, the U.S. finally went to war with the low 200,000s of troops in Iraq. [...] James Fallows, a national correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, has written two major articles on the Pentagon’s planning for the invasion of Iraq and the postwar realities: “Blind Into Baghdad” (January 2004) and “The Fifty-First State” (November 2002), for which he won a National Magazine Award. [2]
This it the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War and we are about to celebrate events like Task Force Smith–valorous fighting by great young Americans. [4]
Asked by a Senate committee to estimate the number of troops needed for the operation, Shinseki said “several hundred thousand.” [...] But the disastrous experience in postwar Iraq has proved the general right: Security remains elusive because the numbers of U.S. and coalition forces on the ground are inadequate. [...] You can’t fall into the trap of organizing for specific missions and then being unable to perform other missions when the conditions change very quickly — and in places like Kosovo, they can change in 20 minutes. [3]
He had dismissed one of the military’s long-standing plans, and suggested his own force level without any of the generals raising a cautionary flag. [1]
Sources:
[1] Eric Shinseki - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Shinseki)
[2] frontline: the invasion of iraq: interviews: james fallows | PBS (pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
[3] The General Who Got It Right on Iraq (www.commondreams.org/views04/
[4] frontline: the future of war: interviews: general eric k. shinseki (www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
[5] Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force’s Size - UN … (globalpolicy.org/security/issues/
[6] USATODAY.com - Army chief: Force to occupy Iraq massive (www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/